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TORT LAW-Supreme Court Opens the Door for Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice: Mireles v. Broderick
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mireles v. Broderick,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
medical malpractice plaintiffs can base their case on a theory of res ipsa
loquitur.2 Prior to Mireles, New Mexico courts required that plaintiffs
provide direct and detailed expert testimony of breach and causation in
medical malpractice actions.' A plaintiff that provided detailed expert
evidence, however, risked losing the procedural benefit of a res ipsa
loquitur theory.4 After Mireles, a malpractice plaintiff is entitled to submit
her theory to the jury whenever she provides expert testimony supporting
a reasonable inference of negligence.' This note summarizes the history
of res ipsa loquitur in New Mexico medical malpractice law, analyzes
the Mireles decision, and explores the effect of this decision on malpractice
litigation in New Mexico.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1985, Plaintiff Mary Ann Mireles underwent a bilateral mastectomy
at Presbyterian Hospital. 6 Defendant Dr. Thomas Broderick was the
anesthesiologist for Mireles' operation. 7 Shortly after surgery, Mireles
developed ulnar neuropathy. 8 Mireles' suit against Dr. Broderick 9 went
to a jury trial on theories of both negligence and res ipsa loquitur. 0
The trial judge dismissed the res ipsa loquitur claim and refused to give

1. 117 N.M. 445, 872 P.2d 863 (1994). Justice Ransom wrote for a unanimous court.
2. Id. at 448, 872, P.2d at 866. Res ipsa loquitur, "the thing speaks for itself," is the principle
that in some situations negligence can be inferred from the attendant circumstances. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 243 (5th ed. 1984).
To make a prima facie case on a res ipsa loquitur theory in New Mexico, the plaintiff must
show: (1) that the injury was proximately caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control
of the defendant, and (2) that the injury-causing event was one that does not ordinarily occur
absent negligence. Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 449, 631 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Ct. App. 1981);
N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1623 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
3. See discussion infra part IlI.B.
4. See discussion infra part III.A.
5. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 449 n.1, 872 P.2d at 867 n.l.
6. Id. at 447, 872 P.2d 865; Rex Graham, N.M. Patients Win Round, ALBUQUERQUE J., June
27, 1994, at Al, AS.
7. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865.
8. Id. Ulnar neuropathy is degenerative nerve damage, in this case affecting the fourth and
fifth fingers of Mireles' right hand. Id.
9. Id. Mireles sued the anesthesiologist, not the surgeon, on the theory that the injuries she
suffered were within the scope of anesthesiologist's duty. See id. According to Mireles' expert,
because the anesthesiologist is the doctor who makes the patient unconscious, it is his duty to
cushion and position the patient's arm during surgery to avoid degenerative nerve damage. See id.
10. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2 5

the proposed res ipsa loquitur jury instruction." The jury returned a
verdict for Dr. Broderick on the theory of ordinary negligence," and
Mireles appealed the court's refusal to instruct on res ipsa loquitur. 3
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding on different
grounds. 4 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded. 5
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW AND RES IPSA
LOQUITUR IN NEW MEXICO BEFORE MIRELES
Prior to Mireles, New Mexico medical malpractice case law conflicted
so fundamentally with res ipsa loquitur case law that it seemed that a
6
res ipsa loquitur theory could never support a medical malpractice claim.
In medical malpractice cases, courts demand that plaintiffs meet rigorous
evidentiary requirements. 7 Courts use the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
in contrast, to offer plaintiffs a procedural bypass to direct proof of
negligence." In fact, courts in some traditional res ipsa loquitur decisions
have penalized plaintiffs for proving too much, 9 while courts in medical
malpractice cases always dismiss plaintiffs who prove too little. 20 The
logical result of this conflict was the court of appeals decision in Mireles,"
which effectively precluded the use of res ipsa loquitur to support a
medical malpractice claim. 22

11. Id. In refusing to give the proposed res ipsa loquitur jury instruction, the court held that
Mireles had failed as a matter of law to establish the factual predicate of exclusive control. Id.
The trial court based this decision on Broderick's evidence that any one of the two doctors and
three nurses in the operating room could have leaned on Mireles' arm, proximately causing the
injury. See Graham, supra note 6, at A5.
12. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 445, 872 P.2d at 863.
13. Id. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865.
14. Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 461, 827 P.2d 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1992). The appeals
majority held that the Mireles's res ipsa jury instruction was improper and unnecessary as written.
Mireles, 117 N.M. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865. See discussion infra part III.C.
Although the holding of the court of appeals was based on the language of Mireles' jury instruction,
the analysis of the court effectively precluded medical malpractice plaintiffs from using a res ipsa
loquitur theory. See discussion infra part III.C. The court of appeals decision was the law in New
Mexico for over two years, and had a significant effect on malpractice litigation involving anesthetized
patients. See generally Graham, supra note 4, at A5. For a discussion of that decision, see Alan
H. Konig, Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Actions: Mireles v. Broderick, 23 N.M.
L. REV. 411 (1993).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 465, 827 P.2d 847, 853 (Ct. App. 1992)
("[Sltill open in New Mexico is the question of when, if ever, res ipsa is applicable in a medical
malpractice case.").
17. See discussion infra part III.B.
18. See discussion infra part III.A.
19. See discussion infra part ilI.A. "Proving too much" in a res ipsa loquitur case means either
using experts, see Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 528 25 P.2d 197, 200 (1933),
or supporting the elements of negligence sufficiently to reach the jury on an ordinary negligence
theory, see Tipton v. Texaco, 103 N.M. 689, 698, 712 P.2d 1351, 1360 (1985).
20. See discussion infra part III.B. "Proving too little" means failing to support the elements
of medical negligence with sufficient expert evidence to survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Cervantes
v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 449, 389 P.2d 210, 213 (1964).
21. 113 N.M. 459, 827 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1992).
22. See infra part ilI.C.
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A.

Res Ipsa Loquitur Case Required Inference from Indirect
Evidence
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows plaintiffs without direct evidence
of the elements of negligence to get their case to the jury based on an
inference of negligence. 23 Instead of directly proving the elements of
ordinary negligence, the plaintiff provides evidence of facts and circumstances surrounding her injury that makes the inference of the defendant's
negligence reasonable. 24 This theory 25relieves the plaintiff of having to
directly prove breach and causation.
A plaintiff risked losing the procedural benefit of res ipsa loquitur,
however, if she proved too much. 26 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
New Mexico was traditionally dependent on the scope of the common
knowledge of lay-people. 27 Courts reasoned that in some situations, the
common sense of jury members was sufficient to infer the defendant's
negligence from the surrounding circumstances. 28 The "common knowl29
edge" of all people justified imposing liability without direct proof.
Traditional res ipsa loquitur analysis in New Mexico began with Hepp
v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co.,30 in which the supreme court held that
a plaintiff in a wrongful death action was not entitled to a jury trial
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur because she relied on expert testimony
and presented a reasonable ordinary negligence case.3 Res ipsa loquitur

23. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 448, 872 P.2d at 866.
24. See id. The issue in a res ipsa loquitur case is whether there is a factual predicate sufficient
to support an inference that the injury was caused by the failure of the party in control to exercise
due care. Id.
If the plaintiff's evidence meets the elements of res ipsa loquitur, the court will permit the jury
to infer the defendant's negligence without direct evidence of specific negligent events. See Mireles,
117 N.M. at 450, 872 P.2d at 868. Prior to Mireles, trial judges in malpractice cases decided as
a matter of law whether the plaintiff had satisfied the elements. After Mireles, the trial judge only
determines whether a reasonable jury could find the elements; if so, the theory is submitted to the
jury for determination. See discussion infra part IV.B.
25. See Tapia v. McKenzie, 83 N.M. 116, 125, 498 P.2d 181, 190 (Sutin, J., specially concurring).
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of common sense and common sense permits an inference
from proof of the injury and the physical agency inflicting it, without requiring proof of facts
pointing to the responsible human cause." Id. (citing Witort v. United States Rubber Co., 223
A.2d 323 (Conn. 1966)).
26. See, e.g., Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 528, 25 P.2d 197, 200 (1933).
"[Where facts and circumstances surrounding the injury themselves point with sufficient definiteness
to warrant an inference [of negligence], then the reason for the application of the rule fails." Id.
27. See, e.g., Mireles, 117 N.M. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865. The Defendant argued in Mireles was
that res ipsa loquitur is limited by the scope of the jury's common knowledge. Id.
28. See Hepp v. Quickel, 37 N.M. at 529, 25 P.2d at 199 (inference of negligence rests on
common experience and not the specific circumstances of the case).
29. See, e.g., id. at 529, 25 P.2d at 200.
30. 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197 (1933). Hepp's husband was killed in car accident when the
brake malfunctioned after the defendant's repair. Id. at 527, 25 P.2d at 199. Hepp presented two
experts who testified that the brake would not have locked if the repair had been done properly,
although neither could say authoritatively exactly what caused the failure. Id. at 530-31, 25 P.2d
at 201-02. Quickel appealed jury verdict for Hepp, and Hepp argued that she had presented a
prima facie case under res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 527, 25 P.2d at 199.
31. See id. at 533, 25 P.2d at 202. The court nonetheless upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff,
holding that the inference of negligence from expert testimony was "permissible" under the rules
of circumstantial evidence. Id. The court deliberately distinguished this inference, however, from
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was not necessary in Hepp because the plaintiff provided "sufficiently
suggestive" evidence of negligence.12 Res ipsa loquitur, in contrast, was

reserved for those cases in which "there was no evidence, circumstantial
or otherwise"

indicating negligence but for the "teaching

of common

experience." 3 3 Under this reasoning, a plaintiff can prove herself out of
a res ipsa loquitur case by either offering expert testimony, or adequately
proving the elements of ordinary negligence. 3 4 As discussed below, the
court of appeals applied an analysis similar to Hepp in Mireles.a5
B.

Medical Malpractice Case Requires Expert Testimony and Direct
Evidence of Negligence
In contrast to res ipsa loquitur case law, medical malpractice case law
demands that a plaintiff meet rigorous evidentiary standards in order to

reach the jury in New Mexico.3 6 Medical malpractice law requires that

a plaintiff prove the defendant's professional negligence with expert tes-

timony.3 7 The expert requirement is subject to only a very narrow "common knowledge" exception,3" which applies only in cases in which the
negligent act involves no medical skill or judgment,3 9 or in which the
event is very simple and the cause is undisputed.4

the inference under res ipsa loquitur. Id. ("[W]e do not invoke the distinctive rule of res ipsa
loquitur."). The inference in Hepp was permissible based on the plaintiff's evidence, including expert
testimony. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 529, 25 P.2d at 201. The cases following Hepp have not uniformly followed its
analysis. See, e.g., Tuso v. Markey, 61 N.M. 77, 82, 294 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1956) (stating that
equating the inference permitted as ordinary negligence in Hepp with a res ipsa loquitur inference).
Many cases have ignored the Hepp court's distinction between a permissible inference from expert
testimony and a res ipsa loquitur inference. See, e.g., Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281, 286, 629 P.2d
784, 788 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that res ipsa loquitur requires facts that lead to a reasonable and
logical inference that the defendant was negligent); Harless v. Ewing, 81 N.M. 541, 545, 469 P.2d
520, 524 (Ct. App. 1970) (stating that the fact that plaintiff introduced evidence of specific negligent
conduct does not preclude res ipsa case).
At least one non-malpractice case has allowed a res ipsa loquitur inference to be based on evidence
of specific negligent acts. See Strong, 96 N.M. at 283, 629 P.2d at 786.
34. See Tipton v. Texaco, 103 N.M. 689, 698, 712 P.2d 1351, 1360 (1985) (stating that res ipsa
was an "unnecessary crutch" because the issue went to jury under ordinary negligence theory and
therefore res ipsa was not the plaintiff's only recourse).
Dr. Broderick advanced both arguments in Mireles v. Broderick, 117 N.M. 445, 447, 872 P.2d
863, 865.
35. See discussion infra part III.C.
36. See generally, Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 448, 389 P.2d 210, 213 (1964) (expert
testimony required as to both breach of duty and causation); Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423,
425, 394 P.2d 269, 271 (1964) (expert testimony that negligence was possible was insufficient).
37. N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1101 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). ("The only way in which
you may decide whether the defendant possessed and applied the knowledge and used the skill and
care which the law required of [him] [her] is from evidence presented in the trial by doctors testifying
as expert witnesses."); see also Schmidt v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 105 N.M. 681, 684, 736 P.2d 135,
138 (Ct. App. 1987).
38. See N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1101 (Duty of doctor).
39. See, e.g., Pharmaseal Lab., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 758, 568 P.2d 589, 594 (1977)
(holding that expert testimony is not mandatory when a particular element of negligence concerns
simple, mechanical and non-technical acts that can be understood by lay people without the assistance
of experts).
40. See, e.g., Mascarefias v. Gonzales, 83 N.M. 749, 752, 497 P.2d 751, 754 (1972) ("A
manipulation of the spine which results in four fractured ribs is not a condition peculiarly within
the knowledge of medical men [sic]").
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Courts will generally dismiss medical malpractice cases not supported

by expert testimony as a matter of law. 4' In Cervantes v. Forbis,42 the
supreme court held as a matter of law that there can be no issues of
fact when the plaintiff failed to offer expert testimony. 43 Likewise in
Buchanan v. Downing," the supreme court held as a matter of law that
plaintiff must make a "minimum showing" by expert testimony as to

both breach and cause to raise an issue of fact in a medical injection
case. 45 Although both the Cervantes and Buchanan plaintiffs argued that
they were entitled to reach the jury on a theory of res ipsa loquitur,
neither decision directly addressed these theories.4
In Smith v. Klebanoff,47 the New Mexico Court of Appeals required
that the plaintiff must not only provide an expert, but also that the
expert must explain precisely how the defendant breached the standard

of care.4 8 The plaintiff produced an expert's affidavit stating that the
undisputed act 49 causing the injury amounted to a breach of the standard
of care.5 0 The court found as a matter of law that the expert did not
sufficiently explain how the defendants' conduct fell below the standard
of care." Therefore, the court concluded that because the expert had

41. See, e.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 229, 377 P.2d 520, 528 (1962) (reasoning "that
the cause and effect of a physical condition lies in a field of knowledge in which only a medical
expert can give a competent opinion ... [Without experts] we feel that the jury could have no
basis other than conjecture, surmise, or speculation upon which to consider" causation.).
42. 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964). The plaintiff brought suit for injury to his knee during
surgery to repair a broken femur. Id. at 446-47, 389 P.2d at 211-12.
43. Id. at 448, 389 P.2d at 213. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's record of the events
during surgery gave rise to a reasonable inference of negligence in the common experience of
laypeople. See id. The court granted the defendants summary judgment based solely on the defendants'
own depositions. Id. at 446, 389 P.2d at 211.
44. 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269 (1964). The plaintiff suffered an adverse reaction and required
a skin graft at the site of an injection by defendant. Id. at 424, 394 P.2d at 270.
45. Id. at 427, 394 P.2d at 273. The plaintiff offered no expert evidence but relied on a statement
in defendant doctor's deposition to raise an inference of negligence. See id. at 425, 394 P.2d at
271. The supreme court reasoned that the because "[m]any things can go wrong" with injections,
the explanation "must be left to those who are schooled and trained in that science." Id. at 427,
394 P.2d at 273.
46. In each case the court held as a matter of law that the common knowledge exception did
not apply, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for failure to provide expert testimony as to the
ordinary negligence elements of breach and causation. See Cervantes, 73 N.M. at 448-49, 389 P.2d
at 213-14; Buchanan, 74 N.M. at 427, 394 P.2d at 273. The court in neither case indicated whether
expert testimony that supported the inference of breach of duty or of causation would be sufficient
to raise issues of fact. See infra Part IV.
47. 84 N.M. 50, 499 P.2d 368 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 83 N.M. 37, 499 P.2d 355 (1972). The
plaintiff underwent surgery for removal of a herniated disc and suffered injury to the arteries in
her neck. Id. at 52, 499 P.2d at 370. The defendants were granted summary judgment on the basis
of evidence indicating that the injury was an inherent danger of the surgical procedure, and that
this injury occurs in a small but statistically determinable number of cases even when the surgeon
is careful. See id. at 53, 736 P.2d at 371.
48. See id.
49. It was not disputed that during the procedure the neurosurgeon penetrated Smith's right
iliac artery and almost severed the right iliac vein. Id. at 52, 499 P.2d at 370.
50. See id. at 57, 499 P.2d at 375. The affidavit of out-of-state expert Dr. Davis stated, "[Tihis
act in the performance of the surgical operation constituted . . . less than the usual caution and
care . . . of medical practice under the circumstances." Id.
51. Id. at 53, 499 P.2d at 371.
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failed to provide an adequate foundation for his opinion,52 the opinion
was incompetent.53 Consequently, without the benefit of expert testimony,
the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact.14 In Schmidt v. St. Joseph's
Hospital,5 the court of appeals indicated in dicta that the plaintiff must
provide expert testimony as to precisely how the injury occurred or exactly
how the defendant breached in order to raise an issue of fact.5 6 The
appeals court required direct proof from the plaintiffs in both of these
cases despite the fact that both plaintiffs were anesthetized when injured."
C. Mireles: Court of Appeals Finds Res Ipsa Loquitur and Medical
Malpractice Law Irreconcilable
The court of appeals decision in Mireles was the natural result of the
conflict between res ipsa loquitur case law and medical malpractice. The
court attempted to avoid choosing between the conflicting evidentiary
requirements of medical malpractice law and res ipsa loquitur" by basing
its decision on the language of the jury instruction tendered by Plaintiff. 9

52. Id.
53. Id.; but see id. at 56-58, 736 P.2d at 374-376 (Hendley, J., dissenting) (contending that the
factual issue had been raised by the expert affidavit together with supporting documents describing
"safer guidelines" for avoiding this type of injury).
54. Id. at 53, 499 P.2d at 371. The appeals court began its analysis from the proposition that
an unfortunate result (injury) does not raise an issue of fact. Id. Citing Cervantes, the court reasoned
that plaintiff must either 1) show "exceptional circumstances" or 2) show that the injury was cased
by defendant's failure to employ due care. Id. The court found no mention of "exceptional
circumstances" in plaintiff's expert affidavit, but did not indicate what "exceptional circumstances"
might be. See id.
55. 105 N.M. 681, 736 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1987). This malpractice action involved substantially
similar facts and the same defendant as Mireles, Dr. Broderick. Note, however, that plaintiff Schmidt
was deemed to have admitted propositions that were fatal to his res ipsa claim because he had
failed to respond to requests for admissions. See id. at 684, 736 P.2d at 138.
56. Id. at 684, 736 P.2d at 138. To illustrate the kind of evidence required to raise a factual
issue, the Schmidt court referred to two factually similar North Carolina cases that reached opposite
results. Compare Hoover v. Gaston Memorial Hosp., Inc., 180 S.E.2d 479, 482 (Ct. App. N.C.
1971) (summary judgment in ulnar neuropathy case proper because plaintiff unable to obtain evidence
as to how and when injury occurred) with Parks v. Perry, 314 S.E.2d 287, 290 (Ct. App. N.C.
1984) (summary judgment improper because plaintiffs provided expert witnesses tending to show
that injury occurred due to mispositioning of arm).
57. Compare generally David W. Louisell & Harold Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 48 CAL. L. REv. 252, passim (1960) (arguing that in case of an injured
anesthetized patient, res ipsa loquitur is the expression of a moral duty owed patient to disclose);
E. Wayne Thode, The Unconscious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to
a Healthy Part of His Body?, I UTAH L. REV. I, passim (1969) (arguing that res ipsa loquitur in
the context of an anesthetized patient is a function of defendant's duty to protect the plaintiff).
58. Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 466, 827 P.2d 847, 854 (Ct. App. 1992) (Bivins, J.,
concurring) (The court assumed, without deciding, that expert testimony could support a res ipsa
theory but expressed doubt that res ipsa loquitur could ever apply in a medical malpractice context).
59. Id. at 460, 827 P.2d 848. The Uniform Jury Instruction for res ipsa loquitur contains a
blank to be filled in with the "name of the instrumentality or occurrence" causing injury. N.M.
UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIv. 13-16230 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). The trial court tendered the instruction
describing the injury-causing occurrence as "inadequate protection of plaintiff's extremities during
anesthesia." Mireles, 117 N.M. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865. The court of appeals found that this
language instructed the jury to find the fact of negligence (ordinary negligence theory) rather than
the premise of exclusive control (res ipsa loquitur theory). Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459,
465, 827 P.2d 847, 853 (Ct. App. 1992). Because Mireles' instruction did not serve the sole purpose
of a res ipsa instruction, it therefore was an "unnecessary crutch" and the appeals court was
justified in refusing it. Id.
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Judge Hartz, however, scrutinized the plaintiff's jury instruction under
an analysis similar to that employed in Hepp,6° and in effect concluded
61
that Mireles had proven herself out of her res ipsa case.
Like the court in Hepp, the appeals court distinguished inferences based
on expert testimony 62 from res ipsa loquitur inferences. 6 3 The court determined that the res ipsa instruction was unnecessary for the jury to
find causation because Mireles' causal theory had already gone to the
jury under the ordinary negligence instruction. 64 The instruction was
unnecessary for the jury to find breach of duty because, as Judge Hartz
noted, the evidence came directly from the testimony of Plaintiff's expert,
and involved no inference. 65 The effect of the court of appeals decision
was to exclude res ipsa loquitur from medical malpractice litigation.
IV.

MIRELES' HOLDING, ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

Supreme Court Holding
In Mireles, the supreme court rejected the court of appeals analysis
and gave plaintiffs two options to choose from: to build a case on
detailed expert testimony, and to reach the jury on a res ipsa loquitur
theory.66 The court found that res ipsa loquitur is not limited by the
scope of common knowledge, 67 and adopted the Restatement position,
which provides that: "[EJxpert testimony that such an event usually does
not occur without negligence may be essential to the plaintiff's case,
where, as for example in some actions for medical malpractice, there is
no fund of common knowledge which may permit laymen [sic] reasonably

60. Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197 (1933).
61. In order to justify refusing to instruct on Plaintiff's theory altogether when "perhaps a true
res ipsa instruction would have been appropriate," the court of appeals found the instruction as
tendered unnecessary. Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 465, 827 P.2d 847, 853 (Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 101 N.M. 462, 466, 684 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1984)).
62. See id. at 462-63, 827 P.2d at 850-51 (the principles of circumstantial evidence already allow
the jury to make reasonable inferences form circumstantial evidence).
63. Id. at 462, 827 P.2d at 850 ([R]es ipsa ... "permits an inference that under customary
standards would be considered too speculative to support a verdict."). The court reasoned that res
ipsa loquitur is only appropriate when the court finds it necessary to inform the jury that the jury
is permitted to make an otherwise improperly speculative inference of negligence. Compare with
Hepp, 37 N.M. at 533, 25 P.2d at 207 (distinguishing res ipsa loquitur inference from one based
on "sufficiently suggestive" evidence). Id. (purpose of res ipsa loquitur to "spell out the desired
chain of inference").
64. Mireles v. Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 465, 827 P.2d 847, 853 (Ct. App. 1992) ("It is not
error to deny requested instructions when the instructions [already to be] given adequately cover
the law to be applied.") (citing Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 101 N.M. 462, 466, 684 P.2d 1127, 1131
(1984)).
65. Id. at 464, 827 P.2d at 852. (jury finding of failure to follow protective procedures described
by expert is not based on res ipsa loquitur inference, but is based directly on expert testimony that
such an omission constitutes negligence). But see Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M.
525, 529, 25 P.2d 197, 201 (1933) (res ipsa reserved for those cases where these is no evidence,
circumstantial or otherwise, of negligence).
66. Mireles v. Broderick, 117 N.M. 445, 452, 872 P.2d 863, 870 (1994).
67. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 448, 872 P.2d at 866 (noting that the common knowledge exception
to the expert testimony rule may inform but does not delimit the application of res ipsa loquitur).
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to draw the conclusion. ' ' 6 The court therefore permitted Mireles to base
her res ipsa loquitur case on the testimony of her expert, Dr. Randall

Waring .69
The court held that the trial judge is under a duty to instruct on res
ipsa loquitur whenever the plaintiff has produced evidence supporting
the reasonable inference of negligence. 0 Mireles was entitled to the instruction because 7Waring's testimony supported each of the elements of
res ipsa loquitur. '

Finally the court rejected Dr. Broderick's argument that Mireles could
not, as a matter of law, satisfy the exclusive control element of res ipsa
loquitur. 72 The court found that the jury could reasonably find exclusive
control from Dr. Waring's testimony that Dr. Broderick had the "ultimate
73
responsibility" to protect the plaintiff from this type of injury.

B. Analysis and Implications
Justice Ransom's analysis in Mireles departs radically from prior law

in four important ways. First, the court rejected the res ipsa loquitur
analysis in Hepp and the court of appeals in Mireles. Second, Mireles
allows plaintiffs to make a prima facie case on probabilities, not specific
evidence. Third, Mireles shifts much of the power to determine whether
res ipsa loquitur applies from the trial judge to the jury. Finally, Mireles
greatly expands the element of exclusive control.
First, unlike Hepp and the court of appeals decision in Mireles, plaintiffs
74
under Mireles do not risk losing their res ipsa case by proving too much.

68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. d (1965), as quoted in Mireles, 117 N.M. at
448, 872 P.2d at 866. The court also cited, without analysis, cases from nine jurisdictions that have
allowed expert testimony to support a res ipsa claim. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 448, 872 P.2d at 866.
See, e.g., Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital, 437 A.2d 1134 (Pa. 1981) (allowing expert
testimony to support both the element of exclusive control and the element of injury ordinarily
does not occur absent negligence).
69. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 448, 872 P.2d at 866. Dr. Waring was an out-of-state anesthesiologist.
Graham, supra note 7, at AS.
70. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 448, 872 P.2d at 866.
71. See id. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865. Waring testified that he believed Mireles' injury, "in all
probability, occurred while she was under anesthesia for [the] surgery." Id. Waring explained that
the ulnar nerve can be injured during surgery by compression, and he described in detail the proper
protective procedure for positioning, cushioning, and monitoring the arm during surgery. Id. According to Waring, the anesthesiologist ultimately holds responsibility for protecting against this
type of injury. Id. Waring concluded that ulnar injury cannot occur during surgery unless the
anesthesiologist fails in these procedures, and that such failure constitutes professional negligence.
Id.
The court also held that Mireles was entitled to go to the jury, notwithstanding the conflicting
evidence presented by the defendant. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 451, 872 P.2d at 869 (court under
duty to give instruction tendered with the words "inadequate protection" where conflicting evidence
on available means to protect). Dr. Broderick offered evidence that he properly positioned and
cushioned the arm, and that the injury possibly could have occurred after surgery. Mireles v.
Broderick, 113 N.M. 459, 460, 827 P.2d 847, 848 (Ct. App. 1992). Broderick also stated that this
type of injury can occur in the absence of negligence. Id.
72. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 452, 872 P.2d at 870.
73. Id.
74. The court stated that evidence of specific acts of negligence strengthens, not destroys, a
plaintiff's res ipsa case Id. at 449-50, 872 P.2d at 867-68 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 2,
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Plaintiffs are now able to provide as much expert and specific evidence
result
as possible without risking their res ipsa loquitur theory.', This will
76
in more malpractice plaintiffs submitting their cases to the jury.
Second, Mireles marks a significant change in the type of evidence
required to make a prima facie malpractice case. In both Schmidt v. St.
Joseph's Hospital" and Smith v. Klebanoff,78 the plaintiffs were required
to establish exactly what transpired in the surgical suite while under
anesthesia. 79 In Mireles, however, the plaintiff was allowed to go the
jury on indirect evidence-on evidence indicating the probability80 that
her injury was the result of the defendant's negligence. 8 New Mexico
like Mireles, to get to the jury without proving
now allows plaintiffs,
2
specific events.

Plaintiffs will probably find it less difficult to obtain expert testimony
on the probabilities of negligence than on specific negligent acts. 3 Justice
Ransom noted in Mireles that "a fellow physician may be disposed to
speak to the necessary predicate but ill-disposed to state the natural
inference that follows."8 s4 The court also noted that Mireles was actually

"unable" to provide direct expert testimony that Broderick's negligent
85
conduct caused her injury.
Third, the Mireles decision shifts the power to determine whether res
ipsa applies from the trial judge to the jury. In malpractice cases like
Cervantes and Buchanan, the judge ruled as a matter of law that plaintiffs
had not met the elements of res ipsa loquitur. 86 Under Mireles, however,

§ 40, at 260) (evidence tending to show specific acts of negligence,. short of a "full and complete
explanation .. . does not deprive plaintiff of benefit of res ipsa loquitur.").
Compare id. with Tipton v. Texaco, 103 N.M. at 689, 698, 712 P.2d 1351, 1360 (1985) (res ipsa
is an "unnecessary crutch" when case goes to jury on ordinary negligence theory).
75. See id. at 450, 872 P.2d at 868 (plaintiff will not lose res ipsa theory unless she furnished
"full and complete explanation of the occurrence," in which case the doctrine is superfluous).
76. See Thomas A. Eaton, Res Ipsa Loquiturand Medical Malpracticein Georgia:A Reassessment,
17 GA. L. REV. 33, 55 (1982) ("The primary anticipated effect of expanding the availability of res
ipsa loquitur through the use of expert testimony is to enable more malpractice claims to reach
the jury.").
77. 105 N.M. 681, 736 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1987).
78. 84 N.M. 50, 499 P.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1972).
79. See Schmidt, 105 N.M. at 683-84; Smith, 84 N.M. at 53.
80. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 449 n.1, 872 P.2d at 867 n.1 (applicability of res ipsa depends
on presence of evidence raising an inference that the accident more probably than not occurred as
a result of breach).
81. See id. at 450, 872 P.2d at 868 (noting that Mireles was unable to provide direct evidence
of the injury-causing events while she was under anesthesia).
82. See, e.g., id. at 450, 452, 872 P.2d at 868, 870 (Mireles unable to provide direct evidence
of negligence, yet essential question is whether the probable cause was one within scope of defendant's
duty).
See also Eaton, supra note 76, at 52. Eaton characterizes the difference between direct and indirect
evidence as follows: "Specificity is the primary difference between this type of expert evidence and
that traditionally presented in malpractice cases. Rather than testifying that a particular act or
omission of the defendant was negligent, the expert would assess the probability that the injury
was the product of negligence." Id.
83. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 449 n.l, 872 P.2d at 867 n. 1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 450, 872 P.2d at 868.
86. See Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 425, 394 P.2d 269, 271 (1964); Cervantes v. Forbis,
73 N.M. 445, 449, 389 P.2d 210, 213 (1964); see also supra part III.B.
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the role of the trial judge will be limited to determining whether a
reasonable jury could find the elements of res ipsa loquitur.87 Where
conflicting conclusions can be drawn from the plaintiff's and defendant's
evidence, the trial judge should instruct on res ipsa loquitur.88 Therefore,
the jury will decide whether res ipsa applies by finding that the plaintiff
has or has not proven the two res ipsa elements.8 9
Finally, the Mireles court greatly expanded the element of exclusive
controlY° The court adopted the Restatement position that '[t]he essential
question becomes one of whether the probable cause is one which the
defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard
against."' 91 As a result, the element of exclusive control potentially
includes all events within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff. 92 A plaintiff can meet the exclusive control element of res ipsa
loquitur despite the fact that parties other than the defendant had access
to the injury-causing instrument. 93
This expanded view of the exclusive control element, combined with
the jury's expanded role in determining whether res ipsa applies, may
subject a greater number of health care providers to liability. 94 The scope

87. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 451, 452, 872 P.2d at 869, 870 (because testimony by Dr. Waring
supported the element of res ipsa, the question should go to the jury).
88. See id. at 452, 872 P.2d at 870. But see Harless v. Ewing, 81 N.M. at 541, 546, 469 P.2d
at 520, 525 (Ct. App. 1970) (non-malpractice case held that when conflicting conclusions can be
drawn from evidence, jury properly decides the issue of whether res ipsa loquitur applies).
The malpractice defendant is accordingly not entitled to summary judgment or directed verdict
on the basis of the defendant's own testimony. Eaton, supra note 76, at 55.
89. See N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1623 (Repl. Pamp. 1991); Strong v. Shaw, 96
N.M. 281, 283, 629 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1980) ("The factfinder makes a determination, based
on experience, whether the occurrence is one of the res ipsa type."); Harless, 81 N.M. at 546, 469
P.2d at 525 (stating that the trial court should not decide the issue of applicability of res ipsa as
a matter of law, and issue should go to jury). If the jury finds the plaintiff has met the elements,
the jury is permitted, but not required, to find for the plaintiff. N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION
Civ. 13-1623. Note that under this instruction, the jury that chooses to make the inference of
negligence next must go back an reconsider whether the injury is consistent with due care. See id.
90. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 452, 872 P.2d at 870. The court adopted the position Justice
Ransom had taken in an earlier, non-malpractice res ipsa loquitur case. Id. (citing Trujeque v.
Service Merchandise Co., 117 N.M. 388, 391, 872 P.2d 361, 364 (1994)).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328(D) cmt. g, quoted in Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 391,
872 P.2d at 364.
92. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 393, 872 P.2d at 366. "All that the plaintiff should be required
to do in the first instance is to show that the defendant .. . was responsible for the management
... of []the thing doing the damage." Id. (quoting Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 43 S.E. 443,
445 (Ga. 1903)). In Mireles, Justice Ransom referred to the scope of the defendant's duty as "the
ultimate responsibility" to protect. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 452, 872 P.2d at 870.
93. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392, 872 P.2d at 365 ("The implication that access itself prevents
application of res ipsa loquitur . . . was improper.").
94. In Mireles the plaintiff's theory was that the injury-causing instrumentality was the plaintiff's
own body, which by its position under anesthesia compressed her ulnar nerve. Mireles, 117 N.M.
at 447, 872 P.2d at 865; see also Rex Graham, N.M. Patients Win Round, ALBUQUERQUE J., June
27, 1994, at Al, A5. Plaintiff Mireles was able to place this cause within the scope of Defendant
Broderick's duty through Waring's testimony that the duty of the anesthesiologist includes properly
positioning, cushioning, and monitoring the arm. Mireles, 117 N.M. at 447, 872 P.2d at 865. Citing
Trujeque, Justice Ransom held that this testimony was sufficient to submit the exclusive control
element to the jury despite Defendant's evidence that any of several people in the surgical suite
had access to Mireles' body. Id.
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of the duty that a health care provider owes to an anesthetized patient
is often far more extensive than the degree of physical control the provider
exercises. The duty a hospital owes its patients is even more broad, and
might arguably include several events by different agents which in concert
cause an injury.95 It may be possible under Mireles to find medical
defendants legally responsible without being present in the surgical suite
at all.
Despite the significant changes in the law outlined above, the Mireles
opinion does not explicitly address the conflict between medical malpractice law and res ipsa loquitur. In fact, the court referred to Hepp
in support of the proposition that New Mexico case law contains no
historical limitation on res ipsa loquitur with respect to expert testimony.96
Hepp, however, illustrates the opposite. 97 The Hepp court deliberately
distinguished the plaintiff's inference of negligence from the presumption
of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 98
The Mireles court also did not resolve the competing policies underlying
the evidentiary requirements of res ipsa loquitur and medical malpractice
law. Courts sitting in medical malpractice cases require detailed expert
testimony because a jury of lay-people generally lacks the knowledge to
determine the factual issues of medical causation and breach of a medical
standard of care. 99 In contrast, judges in res ipsa loquitur cases rely on
the jury to fill in the missing pieces from the plaintiff's case with their
common experience.' °° In medical malpractice cases, particularly those in
which the plaintiff was anesthetized when injured, both of these policies
are important.' 0'

95. See Eaton, supra note 76, at 66-67.
96. See Mireles, 117 N.M. at 448, 872 P.2d at 866 (citing Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply
Co., 37 N.M. 525, 528, 25 P.2d 197, 199 (1933)).
97. The specific passage Justice Ransom refers to does state that res ipsa allows the jury to
infer negligence from the fact of injury and the "surrounding circumstances." Hepp, 37 N.M. at
528, 25 P.2d at 200 (quoting Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.R. Co., 135 N.E. 504, 505 (N.Y.
1922)). However, the passage quoted in Hepp goes on to explain that "surrounding circumstances"
does not refer to circumstances that tend to indicate breach of duty. In this passage "surrounding
circumstances" are "neutral circumstances," and do not contain information about the standard
of care. Id.
98. See id. Under Hepp, res ipsa loquitur is called for only in a very narrow set of cases in
which the finding of negligence is unreasonable as a matter of law, but is irresistible under common
knowledge. Id. ("[W]here the facts and circumstances surrounding the injury themselves point with
sufficient definiteness to negligence on the part of defendant to warrant an inference thereof, then
the reason for [res ipsa loquitur] fails."); see also supra part III.A.
99. See Eaton, supra note 76, at 44 ("[Clourts believe that juries unaided by expert guidance
are incapable of determining what constitutes 'reasonable care' in a medical context."); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962) (finding for plaintiff dismissed based on competence
of the fact-finder). The Woods court reasoned "that the cause and effect of a physical condition
lies in a field of knowledge in which only a medical expert can give a competent opinion ....
[Without experts] we feel that the jury could have no basis other than conjecture, surmise or
speculation upon which to consider" causation. Id. at 225-26, 377 P.2d at 523.
100. See Hepp, 37 N.M. at 528, 25 P.2d at 200 ("It (res ipsa loquitur) is recognized as a rule
of necessity ....
It bases its chief claim to justification on the fact that ordinarily the cause of
the injury is accessible to the party charged and inaccessible to the person injured.").
101. See Louisell & Williams, supra note 57, at 254 (stating that a rational legal order demands
"some suitable device io compel the professional man to disclose the facts needed by his patient").
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Justice Ransom did not articulate in what way res ipsa loquitur, when
adequately supported by expert testimony, is consistent with fault-based
medical malpractice law. 0 2 The elements required for res ipsa loquitur
103 The
serve the same function as the elements of ordinary negligence.
purpose of the expert testimony is to inform the jury sufficiently to allow
4
it to competently decide whether these elements have been satisfied.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Mireles, New Mexico Supreme Court allowed the use of res ipsa
loquitur in medical malpractice cases. Under Justice Ransom's analysis,
the only dispositive issue as to the application of res ipsa is the presence
of expert evidence supporting each of its elements. Using res ipsa loquitur,

a plaintiff can now establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice

based solely on an expert's opinion that the probable cause of the injury
was within the scope of defendant's duty, and that the resulting injury
is inconsistent with due care. As a result, many medical malpractice
plaintiffs will find it less difficult to get to the jury.
TRACY L. RABERN

102. See Eaton, supra note 76, at 53-54 ("The use of experts to establish the probabilities of
negligence assists the fact finder in a manner consistent with principles of fault and the policies
When evidence of the probability is provided
underlying the requirement of expert evidence ....
by a qualified expert, a medical defendant remains judged by a standard of care established by his
peers.").
103. See N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1623. The first element, that the injury-causing
instrumentality be within the exclusive control of the defendant, tends to establish what proximate
cause does in ordinary negligence. Compare KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 39, at 251 (tends to
establish that the cause of injury was within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff),
with Mireles, 117 N.M. at 452, 872 P.2d at 870 (exclusive control defined as whether probable
cause was one within the defendant's duty to the plaintiff). The second element, that the injurycausing event be of a type that does not ordinarily occur absent negligence, tends to establish what
the breach element does in ordinary negligence. See KEETON ET AL., note 2, § 39, at 255-56 (tends
to rule out the possibility that the injury is consistent with due care).
104. See Eaton, supra note 76, at 54.

